By Milton D’Leon and Sandra Romero – Nov 13, 2026
More than 2,000 Salvadoran soldiers, supported by helicopters, drones, and armored vehicles, have been deployed to Haiti by the government of Nayib Bukele. Haiti is a testing ground for a new military intervention: Bukele, Trump, and Erik Prince’s mercenaries.
Only the working class and the oppressed people of Haiti can find a way out of the crisis created by the ruling classes and their governments, backed by imperialism. They must take their destiny into their own hands and reject all forms of military intervention, as well as any occupying forces disguised as “peace” or “security” missions.
The deployment of Salvadoran troops to Haiti marks a new phase of imperialist intervention in the Caribbean. Under the guise of fighting gangs, Bukele is imposing his repressive model and aligning himself with Washington’s strategy to militarize the region; in doing so, he is deepening Haiti’s subordination and denying the Haitian people the right to determine their own destiny.
More than 2,000 Salvadoran soldiers, supported by helicopters, drones, and armored vehicles, have been deployed to Haiti by the government of Nayib Bukele. This deployment reinforces the foreign military presence in a country marked by a long history of occupations and interventions. Bukele justified this operation by presenting it as a mission to locate four military technicians who went missing following an ambush on October 18. However, the size of the contingent, El Salvador’s participation—which had been previously authorized as part of the multinational force—and, above all, the expansion of the operation beyond that framework demonstrate that this deployment goes far beyond the scope of a simple search-and-rescue mission.
In Haiti, various intervention, monitoring, and security mechanisms converge. On the one hand, the Gang Repression Force (FRG) [1], authorized by the UN Security Council; on the other hand, the Haitian security forces as well as a specialized task force created by the Haitian government, which operates with the support of Vectus Global [2]—the private military company owned by Erik Prince [3], founder of Blackwater. This is not a single structure or a unified chain of command, but rather different components of a policy combining state forces, foreign contingents, and private contractors.
US imperialism has provided political support for the Salvadoran deployment and supplies a large portion of the intelligence-related logistics. Colombia has provided logistical support for the transport of troops, while the Dominican Republic has offered facilities for operations conducted from its territory. On November 3, the United Nations clarified that the vast majority of the additional Salvadoran troops are not deployed under the mandate of the Multinational Security Support Mission (MMAS); they therefore fall outside the jurisdiction and reporting mechanisms of its support office in Haiti. Although El Salvador was already participating in the multinational force, this new contingent stems from a decision by the Bukele administration and operates under the chain of command of the Salvadoran armed forces, led by Minister of National Defense René Francis Merino Monroy [4]. It is subordinate neither to the MMAS command nor to United Nations leadership. The political and military decision-making for this operation rests with the Salvadoran executive branch: Bukele and his Minister of Defense are responsible for its direction, conduct, and consequences.

Bukele’s Military Intervention in Haiti
A multinational intervention through 2027 and the privatization of warThe very composition of the MMAS reflects the difficulties in sustaining this operation. The Security Council authorized a ceiling of 5,500 uniformed personnel and 50 civilians; however, as of August 31, only 1,213 military or police personnel from six countries had been deployed. The pace of contingent integration has been identified by the force itself as one of its main obstacles. Despite this, the Security Council has extended its mandate through March 31, 2027. The gap between authorized and actually deployed personnel highlights the difficulties faced by participating governments in providing the necessary forces and sustaining an operation of this scale.
The intervention aims to impose a military solution to the Haitian crisis, in the name of restoring order and security, even as the economic plundering, financial subjugation, and exploitation of the country’s resources by foreign interests continue. The occupation and militarization do not challenge this structure of colonial and imperialist plunder; rather, they perpetuate it and exacerbate the violence, abuses, and human rights violations suffered by the population.
Operations carried out by Haitian security forces and a specialized task force—with support from Vectus Global and the use of armed drones—resulted in at least 1,243 deaths and 738 injuries during 141 attacks that occurred between March 1, 2025, and January 21, 2026, according to data collected by Human Rights Watch. Among the dead were at least 43 adults and 17 children who, according to the organization, were not members of criminal groups. The investigation highlights that some of these attacks may constitute extrajudicial killings and that they were carried out in densely populated urban areas. These figures pertain specifically to drone attacks, not to all security operations in Haiti.
This is the human cost of a policy that treats the use of lethal force as a response to the crisis. The involvement of private military companies constitutes an extreme form of the privatization of war and foreign intervention. Vectus Global, led by Erik Prince, provided support to the Haitian task force by supplying drones, helicopters, and intelligence assistance. Human Rights Watch has also documented that Prince recruited Salvadoran operators to assist the Haitian police in the use of armed drones. Erik Prince’s track record echoes the history of impunity and abuses characteristic of private military companies during the US-led wars of occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Blackwater, his former company, was implicated in the 2007 Nisour Square massacre in Baghdad, during which its employees killed 17 Iraqi civilians.
Nor can the current intervention be viewed in isolation from the history of foreign occupations and missions in Haiti. The United States occupied the country from 1915 to 1934. Decades later, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), deployed between 2004 and 2017, faced numerous allegations of sexual abuse committed by members of its contingents; it was also linked to the introduction of cholera in 2010, an epidemic that caused thousands of deaths. In 2016, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged the organization’s moral responsibility and offered an apology. Although the GSF has a mandate and structure distinct from those of MINUSTAH, this difference does not erase the historical experience of the Haitian people, and international authorization in no way guarantees respect for their rights.
The Salvadoran deployment did not begin with the kidnapping
The disappearance of the four Salvadoran soldiers provided Bukele with a pretext to publicly justify a larger-scale operation in Haiti; however, Salvadoran military involvement in the country did not begin with this event. On September 29, 2026, El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly—dominated by the Nuevas Ideas party and its allies—passed Decree 679 by a vote of 57 to 0 [5]. This decree authorized, for a period of twelve months, the participation of the Salvadoran armed forces in the FRG and provided for the deployment of personnel, aircraft, and equipment in support of its operations. This authorization predates the disappearance that occurred on October 18. It should nevertheless be distinguished from the subsequent expansion of the operation: the majority of the new contingent sent by Bukele operates outside the framework of the FGR, without the agreement governing its activities having been publicly clarified with sufficient clarity.
On November 2, Salvadoran troops launched their first major ground operation in the Cul-de-Sac plain, northeast of Port-au-Prince, targeting the armed groups “400 Mawozo” and “Chen Mechan.” The military advanced in about ten armored vehicles, with the stated goal of dismantling these groups, which have been identified as responsible for the disappearance of the four military technicians. This offensive demonstrates that the deployment is no longer limited to a search-and-rescue operation but has evolved into a direct military intervention against Haitian armed groups.
On October 31, Bukele rejected allegations made by a Haitian organization regarding alleged bombings and airstrikes targeting the civilian population. He stated that the Salvadoran combat helicopters had arrived on October 29 and had not carried out any missions as of that date. This denial does not constitute an independent verification of the facts, nor does it dispel concerns about the risks that military operations pose to the civilian population. The allegations call for an investigation and guarantees of transparency, especially since most of the additional Salvadoran contingent operates outside UN reporting mechanisms.
In line with the rhetoric of the imperialist powers, the Salvadoran government presents violence as a security issue separate from the social and political dynamics that underlie it. Thus, repression and military control are portrayed as inevitable responses to poverty, unemployment, looting, and the deterioration of living conditions. The “punitive approach” for export advocated by Bukele offers no solution to these conditions: militarization, mass incarceration, and repression fatally block any independent political alternative led by workers and the working classes.
The argument of the “war on gangs” is nothing new in Haiti either. It has been used to legitimize successive foreign interventions, many of which were carried out under a UN mandate or with UN support. Although the Salvadoran government now presents its deployment as an operation aimed at locating missing soldiers, its scope and political objectives go far beyond this simple search.
Bukele seeks to internationally promote the model of militarization that has allowed him to consolidate his power—based on mass incarceration and a state of emergency—to present it as an exportable security model, and to establish himself as a leader in the fight against gangs. The intervention in Haiti offers him a new arena to showcase this model and demonstrate his willingness to extend it beyond El Salvador’s borders; in doing so, he strengthens his alliance with Donald Trump and aligns himself with Washington’s strategy to increase military coordination among allied governments on the continent, by deploying troops and operational capabilities in support of this policy.
Reducing the reality in Haiti to the gang phenomenon as it exists in El Salvador is not a trivial oversimplification: it allows military intervention to be presented as a security solution, while obscuring its political implications. On October 30, Bukele stated: “If we’ve eliminated the gangs here, we can eliminate them there. It’s up to them [the Haitians] to decide whether they want us to eliminate them or not.” With this statement, he presents the Haitian population with a false dilemma: either accept that Salvadoran forces “put an end” to the armed groups, or side with those who supposedly stand in the way of pacification. This rhetoric also obscures the fact that armed groups do not operate outside the structures of power: certain sectors of the Haitian political and economic elites have maintained ties with them, while a large portion of the arsenal they use is of US origin. As in any colonial discourse, the people themselves are not allowed to define their own needs or the political solution they wish to build. This logic erases the historical, social, and political differences between El Salvador and Haiti, and deprives the Haitian population of its capacity for action and political organization. Thus, Bukele serves as the spearhead for the implementation of the “Trumpist” strategy in Central America and the Caribbean.
The more than 2,000 Salvadoran troops are thus operating in a context of violence that weighs heavily on the population—violence that cannot be understood apart from the relationships between armed groups, political and economic elites, and imperialist powers. Although Bukele’s intervention aims to increase military capabilities to track down and strike against certain organizations, it does not address either the power networks that have historically encouraged them or the social and political conditions within which their violence persists. On the contrary, it reinforces a policy of occupation, repression, and military control that also subjugates the civilian population. The disappearance of the four military technicians serves as a pretext for the Salvadoran government to publicly justify a larger-scale operation and project its repressive policy beyond its borders, thereby aligning itself with Washington’s interventionist strategy.

Soldiers of the Salvadoran Army
The Haitian crisis will not be resolved by the ‘Bukele model’
Bukele’s repressive approach offers no solution to the Haitian crisis. The Haitian people carry within them a history of resistance, but also a deeply fragmented social structure, marked by decades of imperialist plunder. The violence tearing the country apart today is not purely criminal: armed groups have developed in connection with political and economic networks, territorial conflicts, and revenue streams—both legal and illegal. Certain segments of the economic and political elites have maintained ties with these organizations, relying on them to vie for power, protect their commercial interests, and exert control over territories and working-class neighborhoods. This does not, however, make the gangs a homogeneous bloc, nor does it erase their own interests; but it demonstrates that they cannot be understood without taking into account the power dynamics that run through the Haitian state and ruling classes.
This history is also marked by racism. Haiti has not been treated in the same way as other countries within the international order; its Black population and the anti-slavery nature of its revolution shaped, from the very beginning, the relationship between the great powers and the first independent Black republic. The 1804 revolution not only defeated French colonialism and abolished slavery; it also challenged the racial order upon which the colonial and slave-based system rested. This is why Haitian independence, in turn, led to isolation, threats of reconquest, and economic sanctions. In 1825, France imposed an indemnity on Haiti intended to compensate former slave owners for the loss of their “property,” while the United States did not recognize Haiti’s independence until 1862. Later, the US occupation, from 1915 to 1934, perpetuated this relationship of domination by relying on racist rhetoric that portrayed Haitians as incapable of governing themselves. The image of Haiti—as a backward, violent country incapable of establishing its own political order—is not a neutral description of reality; it is part of a colonial tradition that has served to justify the country’s subjugation as well as foreign interventions.
The Haitian government’s involvement is part of this broader trend toward the militarization and subjugation of the Haitian people. Since February 7, 2026—the date on which the term of the Transitional Presidential Council ended—Alix Didier Fils-Aimé has been at the head of the executive branch. He leads a de facto government, lacking its own electoral mandate, whose continued existence has benefited from direct support from Washington. His administration openly endorses this intervention: it has agreed with Bukele to strengthen security cooperation and supports the deployment of Salvadoran forces. Furthermore, during his tenure, a specialized task force was created that operates with the support of Vectus Global and has carried out drone strikes, which have been condemned by Human Rights Watch. This is a regime rooted in the decay of Haitian institutions, supported by imperialism, and tied to the interests of the local ruling classes. Its collaboration with foreign forces minimizes the country’s sovereignty and facilitates military intervention.
The Haitian government does not even claim any electoral legitimacy. Haiti has not held national elections since 2016, and the election schedule has been postponed yet again; the first round of the presidential and legislative elections has been rescheduled for July 18, 2027. The prolongation of interim governments, in the absence of elections, is inextricably linked to the political and social crisis the country is facing. Washington does not merely support the authorities who facilitate intervention; it also intervenes in shaping the power structures managing the Haitian crisis, while the local ruling classes safeguard their own interests and assume their responsibilities.
The dynamics of violence cannot be reduced to a military confrontation between state forces and armed groups. The Associated Press reported that Wilson Joseph, also known as “Lanmò Sanjou” and leader of the group “400 Mawozo” [6], asked António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, to send a delegation to mediate a dialogue with international forces, while warning of the risk of reprisals against the population. Joseph claimed that the four Salvadoran technicians had died, though he provided no evidence to support this. The UN confirmed that it had received the letter, specifying that this did not imply recognition of the sender or support for his positions. The negotiation initiative taken by the leader of an armed group does not make the “400 Mawozo” group a representative of the Haitian people, nor does it erase the violence it perpetrates against them. It does, however, demonstrate that this confrontation is driven by its own dynamics, calculations, and interests, which cannot be reduced to a mere security operation.
The Salvadoran army is one of the pillars of the coercive apparatus on which Bukele bases his political project: it participates in the state of emergency, the militarization of social life, and the control and discipline of the population. Its deployment in Haiti extends this force beyond El Salvador’s borders. The government is seeking to portray the deployment of troops—by exploiting the nationalism sparked by the disappearance of four military technicians—as a national cause, while obscuring its role in the international military projection of its own agenda, as well as in a Washington-led offensive aimed at strengthening its political and military dominance over Latin America and the Caribbean. In this way, it involves allied governments in missions that the major powers do not wish to undertake alone, using their own forces.
As Foreign Troops Shoot and Bomb Poor Haitians, Popular Anger and Resistance Grow
A military solution that exacerbates dependence
The intervention, spearheaded by the United States, aims to impose a military solution and involve allied governments in it, while sparing Washington from directly bearing the full political, economic, and human costs. The GSF’s insufficient troop levels, the deployment of new foreign forces, and the use of private military contractors reflect a desire to spread the costs of an intervention—which has failed to establish a political solution deemed legitimate by the Haitian people—among allies and contractors. However, this strategy does not rely solely on Washington’s decision and the participation of its allies; it also benefits from the collaboration of the Haitian authorities. The Fils-Aimé government has agreed with Bukele to strengthen security cooperation and supports the Salvadoran deployment. The intervention thus relies on a political regime lacking an electoral mandate, backed by imperialism and tied to the interests of the local ruling classes; this regime opens the door to new foreign military forces, while compromising Haiti’s sovereignty.
Under the guise of fighting gangs and defending regional security, military cooperation between Washington and its allied governments is intensifying, creating conditions conducive to new interventions. In the Caribbean, this policy takes on a particularly dangerous dimension with regard to Cuba. The Trump administration has tightened the economic and energy stranglehold, deepened the island’s political isolation, and publicly maintained the threat of possible military action—although US officials have clarified that no imminent intervention plan exists. This is not to suggest that the deployment in Haiti has the operational mission of targeting Cuba, but rather to place it within a regional context marked by pressure, militarization, and the subjugation of the peoples of the Caribbean. Bukele is seeking to carve out a place for himself within this framework and is using Haiti as a stage to demonstrate his willingness to collaborate with US strategy.
The intervention only serves to accentuate Haiti’s subordination to the major powers. It also helps strengthen the political and military instruments through which Washington seeks to discipline the peoples of the Caribbean and contain any process that challenges its political dominance in the region.
Haiti needs neither foreign tutelage nor new military forces claiming to resolve by force a crisis whose roots lie in imperialist domination, inequality, and the breakdown of the state. International interventions, repeatedly presented as necessary measures to restore order, have not resolved this crisis; on the contrary, they have exacerbated the misery, violence, and subjugation of the Haitian people. A solution cannot come from the powers that uphold this order, nor from new occupation missions legitimized in the name of peace and security. It requires that Haitian workers and the popular sectors be able to organize and build an independent political alternative—in the face of imperialism and the local ruling classes—that will enable them to decide their own future.
Only the working class and the oppressed people of Haiti can find a way out of the crisis created by the ruling classes and their governments, backed by imperialism. They must take their destiny into their own hands and reject all forms of military intervention, as well as any occupying forces disguised as “peace” or “security” missions. At the heart of their struggle, the Haitian people must strengthen their own mass organizations and establish structures for self-determination, relying on their own strength and building internationalist solidarity among workers and peoples.
Notes
[1] The GSF is a multinational contingent integrated into the Haitian police and army, composed mainly of troops and police officers from Chad and Kenya, supplemented by forces from El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Guatemala, and the Bahamas, under a unified international command based in Port-au-Prince.
[2] In August 2025, it was announced that Vectus Global had entered into a ten-year agreement with the Haitian government to combat armed groups and participate in the tax collection system for goods imported from the Dominican Republic. Although the exact scope of this agreement is not clearly defined, it suggests that the intervention could extend beyond military operations to encompass strategic economic functions of the Haitian state.
[3] Erik Prince is a US entrepreneur and former military officer, a political ally of Donald Trump, and the founder of Blackwater, one of the world’s largest private military companies. In 2010, following scandals involving abuses and the killing of civilians by his employees in Iraq, he renamed his company “Xe Services,” and later “Academi.” Prince subsequently founded other private security firms and established Vectus Global, which operates in Haiti.
[4] René Francis Merino Monroy has served as El Salvador’s Minister of Defense since 2019 and is one of Bukele’s key military allies. In 2020, he led the armed military occupation of the Legislative Assembly in order to pressure Salvadoran lawmakers into approving a $109 million loan requested by the government. Following an inquiry, the Assembly concluded that he had lied and evaded questions; it recommended his removal from office and referred the case to the prosecutor’s office due to potential criminal offenses. Bukele ignored this recommendation and kept him in his position. He rejected allegations of arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, and deaths in custody under the state of emergency.
[5] The initiative was presented on September 29 and adopted in 17 minutes, with 57 votes in favor and two against, without any debate or examination of the bill’s content or the repercussions that increased Salvadoran military involvement in Haiti would entail.
[6] The rise and expansion of the “400 Mawozo” group and Wilson Joseph are part of a network of ties between armed groups and certain sectors of the Haitian ruling classes; the latter use these gangs to vie for power, protect their economic interests, and control territories. As is the case with other armed groups in the country, their ability to grow cannot be explained without taking into account the networks of patronage, protection, and complicity that link them to certain sectors of the elite.
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