For nearly two years, Trump has touted a possible summit with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as an imminent possibility. While Trump became the first US leader to meet with his DPRK counterpart in 2018, his attempts since 2020 to rekindle the relationship have faltered. Last week, Washington’s hopes for a summit hit another road block of its own making.

On October 31, the FBI issued a statement accusing the DPRK of conducting a massive $6.34 billion cryptocurrency theft from Binance wallets, the built-in digital accounts for users to manage exchanges. After denying the accusation, Pyongyang issued a stern response that hinted a new stance towards Washington could be forming as a matter of policy.

In a statement given on November 4, Kim Yo Jong, Workers’ Party of Korea director of general affairs, declared, “the continued hostile signal of the US to our state compels the DPRK to reconsider the US entity in various aspects.”

No change in position has yet been declared, but the statement offered a clear sign Pyongyang’s patience is wearing thin.

Kim continued, “It is our clear stand that we have no need to sit face to face with such unreliable and hostile persons who refuse to abandon their policy of confrontation while talking about dialogue.”

While Kim did not rule out the possibility of dialogue, she clarified that “this is not surely equated with national interests for us,” adding, “In the present reality when new records are being set in the implementation of the US hostile policy toward the DPRK, it is natural that new records should be created in our reflective counteraction.”

The “invariable hostile policy”

Kim’s response must be placed in the context of Washington’s overall policy of aggression towards the DPRK, rather than solely as a reply to the FBI. In her own words, “We do not regard the ‘Binance’ hacking incident as any accidental and sudden case or isolated private scheme, but as an extension of Washington’s invariable hostile policy toward the DPRK.”

The phrasing of WPK and DPRK officials is often a subject of curiosity and mockery in English language media. Consequently, the deliberate choices of wording in official communications, and their implications on policy, are often overlooked.

The phrase “hostile policy” is a longstanding term used by the DPRK to describe the hybrid war prosecuted against it by Washington. Here, the basic facts of the Korean situation bear repeating:

• The US is still at war in Korea, since the armistice signed in 1953 was never converted into a lasting peace agreement. To this day, the US retains 80 bases and military installations in Korea, and fields over 28,000 permanently stationed troops.
• The DPRK is widely recognized as one of the most sanctioned countries on earth, having been under some form of US unilateral coercive measure since even before its official foundation in 1948.
• The US and Republic of Korea (ROK) conduct joint war exercises for hundreds of days out of the year on an annual basis. Since 2023, these drills have increasingly included the participation of Japan under the trilateral JAKUS “security cooperation” established that same year — realizing a long-held dream in Washington to unite Tokyo and Seoul under a common war-fighting structure.

Washington’s “hostile policy” is at the heart of its present diplomatic standoff with Pyongyang. While the US has made numerous appeals for a return to dialogue since the failure of the Hanoi Summit in 2019, the DPRK has rebuffed these attempts due to the lack of change in Washington’s posture.

As Kim reiterated in her November 4 statement, “We have already and repeatedly clarified that the US abandonment of its hostile policy toward the DPRK is a major premise and key to solving all problems, and in this context it is needless to say that the US recent act is a clearly retrogressive one.”

The accusation of masterminding the Binance heist is not the only recent example of the US “hostile policy.” In her statement, Kim also referenced ongoing US-ROK war drills, such as the recently concluded Freedom Flag air drills and Iron Mace nuclear war exercises, the imposition of new sanctions that ostensibly target DPRK remote workers, and the publication of the State Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, which listed the DPRK in its lowest category for the 24th consecutive year. The TIP report is often cited as justification for additional US sanctions.

Korea: Trump’s second quagmire

While stumbling through the politically disastrous war in Iran and the backlash to ICE’s crackdown on immigrants at home, the Trump administration has at times looked to Korea as a source for easier returns on its political capital. At times, Washington squeezes Seoul for tributes Trump can brandish as trophies – Seoul’s recent capitulation to dispatch military units near the Strait of Hormuz comes to mind. Yet the real prize, a new summit with Kim Jong Un, continues to elude him.

This August, Trump claimed to have made direct contact with Kim, and told the press he hoped to meet with the DPRK leader this year. Kim Yo Jong’s comments have thrown cold water on that hope at a sensitive time. Trump is scheduled to arrive in Manila on November 16 for the ASEAN Summit, after which he will travel to Shenzen, China for the APEC Summit from Nov 18-19. Last year, Trump attempted to use the occasion of APEC to schedule a meeting with Kim Jong Un that never transpired.

While not yet as politically costly as Iran, the Korean Peninsula has become Trump’s second quagmire. The situations bear some remarkable similarities. Faced with a smaller but nevertheless formidable opponent, the US finds itself unable to proceed either diplomatically or militarily for fear of the political costs. In both cases, Washington may hope to wait out its opponents, but time is not on its side. As US sanctions weaken with time, Trump has few tools available to ratchet up the pressure on Pyongyang.

Resolution in Korea is still possible, but Trump must be willing to pay the price. The DPRK is determined to set the terms of future dialogue with the US, and its conditions are clear: negotiations will not happen at gunpoint. The US president – whether it be Trump or some replacement – who dismantles the “hostile policy” will be given the opportunity to redefine Washington’s relationship with Pyongyang on the basis of equality. This would provoke the wrath of the Beltway, but in time, stand out as a historical achievement.

The trade-off seems fair enough, but political miserliness may win out in Washington. US prestige is in short supply these days. The same could be true for Pyongyang’s patience. Washington would do well to come to the table sooner than later, while an invitation is still available.

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