By Sergio Rodríguez Gelfenstein – Aug 8, 2026
The events that have occurred in Venezuela starting from January 3 have signified a profound upheaval in the country’s political practice. Beyond looking for culprits and traitors, most of the time without any basis and rather motivated by emotional responses to the pain and helplessness caused by the murder of a hundred Cubans and Venezuelans and the kidnapping of President Maduro and his wife, the truth is that the government was unable to prevent what happened and the ruling party has been paralyzed until today, lacking the ability to find responses that go beyond the need to survive or to propose a political plan for the future.
But the Venezuelan people, trained in the political pedagogy of Commander Chávez, are finding in a very short time (less than seven months) new formulas for organization and mobilization that differ from the traditional ones of the last 25 years. The avalanche of meetings, demonstrations, and statements that have taken place in different sectors of society, which reached a turning point on July 24, the anniversary of the birth of the Liberator Simón Bolívar, clearly attest to this.
An organization and mobilization different from the usual and habitual ones are setting the course and indicating the trend for the country’s political future. It is about moving toward resistance to the current state of the country in which the United States government is making the strategic decisions in the economy, finance, and foreign policy.
The trends shown by the facts establish that in the country there is a developing propensity toward a type of movement-based organization, given the failure of party politics as a unifying, organizing, and mobilizing element of society. In theoretical terms, movementism is a political and social trend in which identity and organization are based on a large, broad movement with the participation of diverse social sectors that rely on charismatic leadership instead of a traditional centralized party. To that extent, it is more flexible and massive by integrating various ideological positions. I believe that this is what is needed at this moment to gather a still dispersed national will that is patriotic, independentist, and focused on defending national sovereignty, leading to the formation of a great patriotic, anti-imperialist, and anti-colonialist front, if it is possible to achieve it.
The most successful movementist experience in Latin America emerges from the practice of Peronismo in Argentina. I have turned to Silvano Pascuzzo, a Political Science graduate from the University of Salvador in Argentina and a lecturer in International Relations program at the University of Lanús, to explain his country’s experience in this regard.
To illustrate, Pascuzzo goes back to September 16, 1955, when a civic-military uprising occurred against the democratic government of General Juan Domingo Perón. The Argentinian researcher says, “Peronismo as an activist organization was already mortally wounded. Ten consecutive years in power had transformed it into a bureaucratic structure that only knew how to repeat slogans, perform rituals, and threaten with harsh reprisals, which never materialized. It is not that it had stopped being ‘popular and representative,’ but that it was no longer ‘revolutionary.'”
The reactionary uprising unleashed boundless violence due to the government’s inability to respond effectively. Although the insurrection failed, General Perón opted for leniency with the rebels in order to avoid a bloody civil war. He proposed a dialogue that was rejected. The acting political forces opted for violence.
Perón decided to leave the country, and the force that supported him was left “anguished and perplexed.” Thus, an unprecedented violence was unleashed by General Aramburu and Rear Admiral Rojas. A brutal obscurantism was unleashed in which the names of Perón and his deceased wife Evita were banned by decree, high-ranking leaders were imprisoned, and activists were persecuted.
The mass movement that supported Perón and which, according to Pascuzzo, was “the greatest in America,” crumbled as the coup government announced the end of Peronismo, which, according to the regime’s acolytes, “would soon be surpassed.” In that situation, John William Cooke emerged, a former congressman of nationalist origin with no significant ties to Perón, rather an exponent of profound differences with him, but “a faithful and passionate follower of the Leader and his Doctrine.”
Cooke had developed an accurate diagnosis of the situation and aimed to confront the regime by placing the focus on grassroots mobilization, “from popular bases, which–he rightly thought–were still intact.” He demanded that Perón return to his doctrinal principles and call on the workers to be active protagonists of his government work. He rejected the “foolish authoritarianism,” the ritual of power, the palace conspiracies, and the abuse of a “combative rhetoric” disconnected from reality. In short, he was not an ardent supporter of the rapprochement with the United States, initiated in search of investments in the energy sector, between 1952 and 1954.
Cooke ended up imprisoned and prosecuted, along with other leaders. In that situation, he recommended “calm, patience, and a serious plan that included ‘specific but effective actions of resistance,'” capable of showing the people that Peronismo was still alive, in the midst of defeat. His reflections received a prompt response from Perón, leading to a high-level exchange with significant repercussions for the future.
The context created conditions for a group of army officers and nationalist civilians to rise up in arms against the dictatorship on June 9, 1956, although Peronismo, as a “mass phenomenon,” did not react and was absent. Although the uprising failed, it was a sign that things were changing in the political landscape. The regime began to erode due to its own contradictions, internal disintegration and demoralization of its support bases started, important figures abandoned the dictatorship while the necessary circumstances for a broad unity of the opposing sectors were created, who no longer expressed rejection toward Peronismo.
Pascuzzo continues recounting that after his escape from prison, Cooke was appointed by Perón as “his personal representative in the underground,” obtaining the unofficial title of “Chief of Staff of the Resistance.” In that context, he had reached the sufficient stature sufficient with Perón and the need for a medium and long-term strategy for the until-then apathetic national and popular movement.
Cooke proposed to give “tactical leadership” to Peronismo through the promotion of new leaders to whom responsibilities should be assigned in the midst of the struggle, especially those who had real and concrete connections with the world of labor, the Church, the Armed Forces, and culture. Cooke considered, “Resisting meant bringing together–in a dense network of clandestine cells–the best of the ‘Community’, its most ethical and educated elements, to lay the foundations for a subsequent ‘mass uprising.'” In this way, starting with multiple forms of peaceful struggle at first, they called to “Resist to Live, Live to Fight, and Fight to Return.”
Perón—from exile—had the merit of recognizing the moment and its dynamics, listened, reflected, and acted “stripped of egos, formalities, and small ambitions.” Under the guidance of the Leader—from exile—the Peronist movement began to act. Pascuzzo reports that at a later moment, “in the neighborhoods, the residents organized barricades, blackouts, and small attacks.” The intellectuals published books and articles defying censorship; they gave talks, traveled, and traveled to remote places, enlightening the activists, recounting forgotten stories, and explaining fundamental processes.
A turning point occurred. According to Pascuzzo, “The middle-class professionals, cynical and haughty, turned activists; the university students—the vanguard of ‘gorilismo’ [anti-Peronismo] in past times—turned into activists; the women transformed their underwear into hiding places for carrying clandestine correspondence. The priests from the pulpits and the military in the barracks decided to return to the ‘common home’ that they had abandoned in 1955, prisoners of anger, confusion, and ignorance. Cooke had saved Peronismo, removing its burden of a bureaucratic, corrupt, and demagogic project,” ensuring it returned to the path of struggle and combat against the dictatorship across the board.
The impact was immediate, the worker delegates without their unions—which had been dissolved by the dictatorship—created internal committees in hallways, break rooms, and factory dining halls explaining the virtues of the bright past they had not known and which had been made possible thanks to Perón and Evita. It was considered the right time to hold internal “elections” within Peronismo.
But the reaction of the Radical Civic Union (UCR) also took place, the political party that in 1946 had been the main architect of the opposition to Peronismo, now found itself–a decade later–irreparably divided over the acceptance or rejection of the legalization of the Justicialist Movement. They were peering into the future and knew the consequences it would bring.
A radical faction led by Rogelio Frigerio, an Argentinian journalist and politician, traveled in 1957 to Caracas, where Perón was in exile. In the presence of Cooke, he offered the former president, “a juicy tactical agreement, requesting his support in exchange for the normalization of the unions and the lifting of the proscription.” With caution, Perón did not give an immediate response. He considered that he should discuss the proposal with Cooke. He knew that the legalization of Peronismio, the reorganization of the [trade union] CGT, and his own return to the country were important. He thought that he could build, together with Frigerio and a sector of radicalism, an “Anti-Oligarchic and Industrialist Front.” He agreed with Frigerio on economic and international policy issues and did not want to waste any more time, but he needed to know Cooke’s opinion before giving an affirmative response.
Cooke had doubts. He did not trust the radicals or Frigerio. He sensed that their proposal entailed “a cunning ruse to come to power, and then an attempt to co-opt a portion of Peronism–its bureaucratic and conservative wing–with ‘seductive siren songs’.”
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He told Perón that he would support him, whatever decision he made, but that he thought the best strategy at that moment was to stay on the sidelines. He thought that they should continue resisting a “political system tainted with nullity, until [Peronismo] was legalized by a defeated regime, through organized popular struggles.” But Perón accepted the agreement, and the “Pact of Caracas” was signed, which gave Frondizi the presidency of the nation in 1958. History proved Cooke right; once in power, Frondizi and the radicals did not fulfilll their commitment. On the contrary, unions continued to be persecuted, and Peronismo remained illegal. The shift to the right meant unpopular economic adjustments that were rejected and resisted in the streets by Argentinians.
Cooke was forced to reactivate the Resistance and in 1959, 62 unions of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) demanded the immediate normalization of their bodies. The workers remained Peronists and wanted to participate in the major strategic discussions.
Pascuzzo concluded, “In 1960, Cooke resigned from his position, supporting the triumphant Cuban Revolution on January 1, 1959. He never broke with Perón, as he remained loyal to him until his death in 1968. He was convinced that Peronismo had to be a ‘mass movement’ with an insurrectional strategy, given that the times of moderation and bloodless reforms had irretrievably passed.”
Each country is different, its history and circumstances are expressions of its particularities, but it is important to study the experiences that provide valuable lessons in the everyday struggle. Peronismo is unique to Argentina; however, any diligent reader will discover in the text some variables that, from my point of view, must be taken into account in today’s Venezuela, given the facts and circumstances. Not by chance, Commander Chávez always expressed extraordinary admiration and respect for General Perón.
(Sergio Rodríguez Gelfenstein blog)
Translation: Orinoco Tribune
OT/SC/CD
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