The following is from an interview with La Izquierda Diario (LID+) International Network, in which Maryam Alaniz discusses the organic crisis — and the crisis of the Trump administration — which is hitting the two-party system hard. Alaniz also discusses the approaching midterms, and the changing U.S. political landscape shaped by growing radicalization among workers and young people.
An Organic Crisis in the United States, Far from Resolved
We’re facing a rather significant moment in the organic crisis in the United States — that is, a profound crisis of legitimacy. If we think about it, 10 years after its emergence, Trumpism is going through a deep crisis. On the one hand, it’s trapped in a humiliating war in Iran, and on the other, it’s facing setbacks in areas central to its authority, such as the ICE crackdown on migrants — which began to encounter resistance after the protests in Minneapolis.
Trumpism emerged as a kind of reactionary response to the crisis of neoliberalism and the traditional political system. In other words, it took real problems — such as the decline in living standards, deindustrialization, and social unrest — but directed that discontent against migrants, women, the LGBTQ community, and the Left. That is how it conquered the Republican Party, displaced its old leadership, and organized a base around nationalism, xenophobia, and the promise of restoring the “greatness” of U.S. imperialism.
Returning to the White House, however, does not mean Trump has succeeded in building a new hegemony. Deep down, Trump did not solve the problems that facilitated his return: the high cost of living, job insecurity, and the lack of prospects. So, although he retains a hardcore base and control of the Republican Party, the gap is widening with those who voted for him hoping for economic improvements, stability, or an end to the wars. In other words, he can advance through coercion, but he cannot build a stable social consensus — especially in the wake of the consequences of the war with Iran, which many are already calling one of the most unpopular wars in U.S. history.
At the same time, Trump’s decline does not mean that the Democratic establishment has regained its authority. In fact, according to a Quinnipiac poll, only 20 percent approved of the Democrats’ work in Congress, while 72 percent disapproved. Many people may vote for the Democrats to punish Trump, but that does not mean they will once again trust a leadership identified with big business, imperialist wars, and a social order that offers no way out.
And it is precisely in this vacuum that a neoreformist phenomenon is growing, of which Mamdani is a central figure. This is because he manages to connect with the demands of workers, young people, immigrants, and sectors mobilized in support of Palestine. He calls for a rent freeze, the expansion of public services, taking on the billionaires, and challenging U.S. foreign policy.
And for this reason, his gains show that the crisis of representation has already taken hold within the Democratic Party itself. But the strategic problem is that this neoreformism seeks to develop these aspirations within the party and through the administration of the capitalist state. In other words, on the one hand, it expresses a genuine radicalization, but on the other, it can contain it and channel it toward the primaries, the elections, and the renewal of the Democratic Party apparatus.
The relationship between the establishment and the reformist wing combines confrontation, dependence, and integration. On the one hand, the establishment attempts to defeat the reformists when they threaten its leaders, donors, or foreign policy, as demonstrated by the censure of Rashida Tlaib — a Democratic congresswoman from Michigan and member of the DSA — when she questioned the Democratic Party’s pro-Zionist policy. But when it cannot defeat them, it seeks to moderate and co-opt them. This is evident, for example, in the slogan “Abolish Trump’s ICE,” which frames the issue as if it were solely Trump’s version of ICE rather than the institution itself. At the same time, the reformists contest nominations but continue to depend on the Democratic Party apparatus and electoral strategy.
Thus, in the run-up to the elections, the organic crisis is reorganizing around three tendencies. On the one hand, there is a Trumpism that retains an enormous capacity for attack but fails to stabilize the country. On the other, there is a Democratic establishment that can benefit electorally from Trump’s decline but fails to regain its former authority. Finally, there is a rising neoreformism that articulates progressive demands but attempts to keep them within the confines of the Democratic Party and the capitalist state.
The major contradiction is that there is enormous social discontent, but there is still no independent political force of the working class that is up to the task. That is why the question is not only who wins the election, but who manages to organize all that anger: the reactionary Right, the Democratic Party through its reformist wing, or an independent alternative based on class struggle and grassroots organization.
Class Struggle, and Shifts in Consciousness
It seems to me that in many ways the organic crisis in the United States is entering a new stage, because there have been experiences of struggle that have left their mark on the consciousness of millions.
We are not witnessing a linear shift to the left. But there is a new generation that has gone through Black Lives Matter, the strikes and union organizing following the pandemic, the movement for Palestine, and now the resistance against ICE. All those experiences have been changing the questions that workers and young people ask about the state, racism, imperialism, and capitalism.
First and foremost, Palestine was central. Far from being a niche cause or one limited to college campuses, it became a mass political issue. It mobilized hundreds of thousands, cut across universities, unions, and immigrant communities, and called into question U.S. support for Israel. It was not the sole cause of the Democrats’ defeat, but it did weaken the party’s relationship with Arab, Muslim, and youth sectors. Figures like Mamdani connect with that sentiment, but they operate within a party whose leadership continues to defend the alliance with Israel.
Furthermore, the Palestine issue demonstrated how universities, the police, the two major parties, and the state can act in concert to defend imperialist interests. That experience may resurface now in the face of war with Iran. There is not yet an anti-war movement of the same magnitude, but there is a latent resistance to entering another protracted war.
A second element is the resistance to ICE, especially in Minneapolis. There, something we had already seen with Black Lives Matter reemerged: a state force acting with violent and racist methods. The immigration crackdown sparked protests, solidarity networks, school and business closures, and actions that took on the characteristics of a general strike.
Crucially, the struggle was not limited to the immigrant population. The defense of immigrants was combined with opposition to state violence and the participation of workers, students, and entire communities.
In this way, it demonstrated how a democratic demand can become a meeting point for different exploited and oppressed sectors.
A third element is the resurgence of the labor movement since the pandemic. There were union-organizing drives at Amazon and Starbucks, major strikes, and a wider spread of grassroots organizing methods. Unionization rates remain low, but we are once again beginning to see the working class acting as a collective force.
This was also evident at the Labor Notes conference — a network and publication of the U.S. labor Left — where a significant portion of the union rank and file expressed the vitality of an advanced sector of the labor movement. This sector seeks to go beyond purely economic demands and to link union organizing to the fight against ICE, the defense of immigrants, solidarity with Palestine, and the building of a political force of its own for the working class.
At the same time, since Sanders’s first campaign, the aspiration to build a third party has been growing. According to Gallup, 62 percent of the population believes that Republicans and Democrats represent society so poorly that a third force is needed.
All this helps explain both the growth of the DSA, which now has at least 100,000 members, and the development of a broader socialist phenomenon in the United States. This cannot be explained solely by a single candidacy but rather by thousands of people who are once again incorporating activism into their daily lives: they participate in meetings, reading groups, neighborhood campaigns, unions, tenants’ organizations, and left-wing social gatherings.
That said, “socialism” means different things to different sectors: defeating Trump, reforming the Democratic Party, supporting unions, fighting for Palestine, or building a third party. That is why we cannot equate this phenomenon with the strategy of its leadership. There is a genuine political search that is not necessarily directed toward the Democratic Party.
Ultimately, these struggles produce subtle shifts in consciousness. Although electoral illusions and many contradictions persist, experiences of mobilization, grassroots organizing, and confrontation with the state are also accumulating.
The Democrats, DSA, and the Question of a Third Party
We’re facing a real phenomenon that the Democratic establishment cannot ignore. Sometimes it tries to attack or block it, especially when the issue of Palestine arises. Opposition to Zionism doesn’t just challenge certain leaders. It also clashes with the strategic interests of U.S. imperialism and with the United States’ alliance with Israel.
In the most recent primaries, this was evident in the disputes between DSA candidates and leaders funded by organizations linked to AIPAC, the main pro-Israel lobby in the United States. The establishment seeks to contain this radicalization because a break with Zionism could open up a much broader discussion about imperialism, military spending, and the role of the two major parties.
But the Democratic Party does not act solely through obstruction. It also functions, as I mentioned earlier, as a graveyard for social movements: it absorbs their demands, co-opts their leaders, and transforms mobilization into electoral campaigns.
In this process, the reformist wing serves as a bridge. Its leaders voice genuine demands but channel them without challenging the system. Anger at ICE may erupt in the streets under the slogan of abolishing it, only to be diverted toward candidates who promise merely to limit its abuses. In other words, instead of using campaigns to strengthen independent mobilization, they use mobilization to strengthen the campaigns.
In the face of this, we need an organization and leadership capable of demonstrating that political independence is indeed possible.
Independent candidacies such as those of Kshama Sawant in Washington, Brittany Kubicek in Rhode Island, and Robin Wonsley in Minneapolis remain exceptional and have political limitations, but they express a genuine search for an alternative outside the two-party system.
For this reason, we can say that elements of a pre-party situation exist: millions are looking for something different, tens of thousands identify as socialists, and a new generation of activists wants to organize. The DSA has grown and achieved important victories, but its strategy remains to contest elections from within the Democratic Party.
And that’s where a very clear contradiction arises. Thousands of people are canvassing neighborhoods and talking to workers, but that energy is directed primarily toward canvassing and elections, rather than creating permanent spaces for discussion, organizing in workplaces, neighborhoods, and universities, and preparing for the class struggle.
The problem is not the elections themselves but a strategy that does not trust the working class to build its own political organization. At Left Voice, we argue exactly the opposite: the conditions exist to begin building an independent socialist alternative.
It is not a matter of proclaiming a third party overnight but of intervening in struggles, winning the trust of the most advanced sectors, and using elections as a platform to organize the working class. The Left Front in Argentina and Myriam Bregman, in my view, demonstrate that a socialist candidacy can win over a mass audience without being diluted within a capitalist party.
So the strategic question is this: Will this new activism be used to revitalize the Democratic Party, or will it become the starting point for building an independent organization? The conditions for waging that struggle already exist. What is missing is a leadership that trusts in the capacity of the working class and is committed to building that alternative.
The post A New Political Moment? Trumpism’s Crisis, the Midterms, and Shifts to the Left in the U.S. appeared first on Left Voice.
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