This article by Mario A. Campa Molina originally appeared in the August 12, 2026 edition of SinEmbargo, a Mexican digital news outlet.
The tsunami of investment in artificial intelligence is reaching notable dimensions. As once happened with the internet, artificial intelligence is taking shape as an unstoppable technology. The so-called “data centers”—enormous facilities that constitute the central nervous system of AI tools like ChatGPT and Claude—are in full boom. The United States, home to Silicon Valley and its multinationals, is pulling ahead of a pack that is beginning to fall behind. Beyond the natural forces of the market, where demand attracts its supply like a magnet, Washington’s visible hand is altering supply chains. That reconfiguration is elevating unexpected winners, like Mexico.
In the first five months of 2026, Mexican exports of AI-related electronic inputs climbed 313 percent compared to the same period the previous year.
The Trump administration imposed tariffs on imports across a wide range of sectors to reverse trade deficits, particularly with China. Although some of these tariffs were struck down by the Supreme Court and later restored indirectly through avenues like Section 301, the United States lacks the domestic capacity to produce the supply of chips that AI companies and data centers need to meet the enormous demand. In the short term, productive limitations at home and trade barriers against the epicenter of the world’s electronics manufacturing pushed U.S. companies to turn to other markets. In those choppy waters, Taiwan and Mexico fished for market share.
As the key to this commercial dynamism, computer equipment as a trade category lacks strict rules of origin within the T-MEC. While Mexico exports to the United States with tariffs close to zero, China faces prohibitive tariffs. In just a few years, China went from representing one in every four dollars imported by the United States to less than one in every 10. That void was filled in electronics by Taiwan and Mexico, whose average tariff gained appeal relative to China, where key technology companies like Apple and Foxconn are reducing productive capacity.
The trade-balance figures confirm a jump in imports of goods used by data centers, despite Trump’s tariffs. U.S. imports of computer hardware and semiconductors exceeded 450 billion dollars in 2025, registering a 60 percent increase in the twelve months following Trump’s inauguration in January 2025. And in the first half of 2026, the categories where one would expect to see exponential growth met the expectations of a boom. Computers, semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, and computer accessories galloped against the current of practically all other imported goods. While the entry into force of new tariffs, such as those contemplated under Section 301 after the Supreme Court’s setback to Trump, may have prompted a front-loaded buying effect, it does not fully explain the story, especially in contrast with non-perishable consumer goods that did not share the same fortune.
Mexico is making a virtue of necessity and taking advantage of the reconfiguration of trade. The United States’ main trading partner rose from fifth to third place among the world’s largest computer exporters, displacing the United States and Hong Kong and capitalizing on a drop of more than six percent in Chinese exports. In 2025, computer exports rose 145 percent to reach 85.4 billion dollars (vs. 34.9 billion in 2024). In the first five months of 2026, Mexican exports of AI-related electronic inputs climbed 313 percent compared to the same period the previous year. Computer exports grew so much that they relegated automobiles to second place among the main traded goods.
An emerging risk is that Trump will use the newly proposed annual reviews of the T-MEC to erect new barriers to computer imports. Nevertheless, the crony capitalism practiced by the White House and Silicon Valley since Trump’s return—increasingly evident in the military uses of artificial intelligence—would make it hard to shoot themselves in the foot over North American exporters like Flex, Intel, or even Foxconn, the Taiwanese company with close ties to Microsoft and OpenAI. It is a small life raft in the sea of commercial uncertainty.
One pending matter Mexico has not managed to overcome is attracting investment in semiconductor manufacturing. The fact that the sector is highly capital-intensive makes it difficult to draw big names, like TSMC. Other players, like Samsung, prefer the comfort—and the incentives—of concentrating capacity at home. Nevertheless, to level the uneven playing field against established peers, development banks, the Afores (Mexico’s private pension funds), and the Real Estate Investment Trusts (FIBRAS) could take a more active role with the help of central planning. A national data-center plan, alignment with the renewable-energy supply, and preferential treatment in the emerging Poles of Wellbeing (Polos de Bienestar) are examples of friendly public policies.
A greater constraint is the meager innovation on national soil. The bad news: as one of the countries that devotes the fewest resources to R&D relative to the size of its economy, Mexico is dependent on importing technologies. The good news: it is a removable corset. When China set learning as its mission, it signed technology-transfer agreements in exchange for market access. In some extreme cases, like that of high-speed trains, it bought leading foreign companies in order to later distribute the patents and know-how among local players. By capacity and scale, the Mexican government can and must play a greater role.
Under the PAN governments and that of Peña Nieto (PRI), the central narrative of Mexican manufacturing was its appeal in the automotive industry, turned into an epicenter of foreign-exchange earnings. That category lost its luster because of Trump’s tariffs and uncertainty, and it is unlikely to return in the short term. In exchange, a new opportunity is springing from the ashes of the turbulent trade relationship. Mexico could be one of the factories of the backbone of artificial intelligence if it rides the wave well. Although the first checkpoint is the T-MEC review, where a defensive strategy is unavoidable, extracting greater benefit from the data-center boom in the United States requires moving afterward to the offensive.
Mario A. Campa Molina is a political and industrial economist,
a graduate of Columbia University's MPA program (2013–2015).
He is a columnist and panelist for various media outlets
and a contributing editor.
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