How might one summarise the main thrust of the argument developed by Christoph Menke in his article ‘“Reason of State”’, which appeared in the latest issue of the German cultural journal Merkur (April 2026) and has now come out in French and English?[i]

Freedom as a quality is said to be a naturalisation and dehistoricisation of freedom as liberation. Anyone who claims to be free, therefore, is deceiving themselves as to the fact that they must liberate themselves and that their liberation is an ongoing process. From a political perspective, the establishment of a republican state is said to represent this position, the position of deception or self-deception. The event of the French Revolution, which Menke does not mention, is presumably its decisive modern or contemporary point of reference. From a political perspective, the establishment of a state that turns against itself and thereby takes on paradoxical traits is said to represent the other position, the recognition of a becoming, a becoming-free, within a paradigm of freedom which thwarts being. Menke not only links this position to a historical point of reference—the exodus of the Hebrew people from Egypt, their liberation from the pharaonic yoke—but sees in it a discovery and disclosure of history itself. True freedom, which does not misunderstand itself in naturalistic-republican fashion, is historical and, according to Menke, is given a proper name: the name Israel.

Israel is to be the name of a state that is constantly working towards its own abolition, towards the abolition of human domination, whereby such labour must be understood as a spiritual one, as one that has nothing natural about it, nothing of a natural force. If, as Menke observes, liberation begins with the hearing of another voice—which is not the understanding of a specific message—then one must not confuse such hearing with a sensory experience either. That the spirit hears, finds itself in hearing and listening, means that its bearer frees himself from his nature and ceases to lead a merely natural, ahistorical, unfree existence. That is also why he can become entangled in a paradox, why human existence proves to be paradoxical: that is its freedom, to put the thought in Menke’s manner.

A non-paradoxical, non-spiritual existence goes hand in hand with domination, with lack of freedom. A paradoxical, spiritual existence, an existence that historically frees itself from nature, turns against domination, but only by passing through domination, through the establishment of a state that must be abolished. One cannot rid oneself of nature without nature, of bondage without bondage, of domination without domination, of the senses without the senses. Whenever we are dealing with this kind of liberation, we are dealing with Israel; we orient ourselves towards Israel. For Israel is said to have showcased liberation to humanity. It has demonstrated to humanity what it means to be more than human. To be more than human means to transcend oneself as a human being and thereby to bear witness to one’s humanness, in the form of a future humanity, the creation of which is the result of a spiritual-historical process and is thus the antithesis of the state and domination, of nature.

So, either the people who liberate themselves orient themselves towards Israel, which has always historically preceded them and to which they owe the discovery of history and, with it, that of true freedom, of freedom as liberation into humanity, which abolishes the state and domination, or else people remain bound by nature, unfree, subject to domination. Yet, the concept of freedom contains a proper name. It reveals itself first and only in the name Israel, regardless of whether one utters this name or not. Without Israel, there is no freedom. Even fulfilled humanity will be the humanity of Israel, at least to the extent that its fulfilment had to be achieved, for that humanity had to be constructed and realised to become what it is. Israel is the indelible name of humanity, the name whose erasure would erase humanity. Israel is not just any name, a name amongst many other names. Rather, Israel is a chosen name, a name that has a privilege, the other and inseparable side of the concept of humanity, which humanity can never fully appropriate, because the name Israel initiated, enabled and conditioned humanity’s foundation, setting in motion and accomplishing its conceptualisation. Israel is the alibi of humanity – of the state and its abolition, if abolition is to be the state’s own fulfilment.

What follows from these premises and consequences of Menke’s argument, from this universalism which is at the same time a particularism—not the movement of a world spirit that progresses from one national spirit to another and brings itself to the fore ever more clearly, but the movement of a national spirit that proves itself to be a world spirit, without ever being able to merge completely into it? The paragraph ‘Critique of Israel’, with which Menke’s article concludes, refers to the immediate present, implicitly to the Israeli government’s military campaign in the Gaza Strip. It contains the sentence that Menke himself regards as the conclusion of his article: ‘The defence of Israel must therefore be just as unconditional as its criticism, without leniency, excuses or pretexts.’ Why is this so? The answer reads: because freedom as liberation is the only freedom, an unconditional claim is inherent in it; yet, in order to fulfil this claim and realise itself as freedom, it must always begin with bondage and expose itself to bondage. If freedom is essentially liberation, it can only be so if it turns against itself, against the fact that it requires bondage and reproduces it. As liberation, freedom must be as unconditionally self-critical as it must unconditionally hold fast to itself, never ceasing in its self-defence. Israel is the name of this double unconditionality.

It is important not to misunderstand this idea. With his concluding sentence, Menke does not wish to claim that the political actions of the historical state of Israel, like those of any other state, deserve and must tolerate a certain degree of criticism, even though this criticism must never go so far as to call the existence of Israel into question. Rather, Menke means to say that both criticism and defence are measured against an unconditional principle; there is, or can be, no measure for them. Criticism and defence of Israel—a name upon which the concept of freedom depends, the liberation of people into humanity—are either boundless or they are null and void. Every political act of the historical state of Israel that is open to criticism can and must always be justified by the fact that it is defended for the sake of the existence of this state, of its own historical survival. It alone guarantees the survival of freedom as liberation. It alone guarantees the abolition of state and rule, or the idea of humanity. One form of excess—that of criticism and self-criticism—challenges and brings forth the other form of excess—that of defence and justification—while keeping it in check.

That is why Israel eludes us in a hyperbolic double movement, in an exaggeration unattainable by any other historical people or state. It eludes any approach. Its paradoxical constitution, its radical vulnerability, confers upon its state a permanent untouchability, one that remains beyond reach, both in the course history and at its end. The particular name, which resists the conceptualisation or the generalisation of freedom, marks this withdrawal, which constitutes the centre of Menke’s theological-political model.

If Menke leaves the contemporary relevance of his ‘critique of Israel’ somewhat vague, this may be due to a politically motivated reticence. However, it is primarily because his model removes Israel furthest away from history precisely where Israel becomes most deeply entangled in it and where its disregard of freedom calls for criticism. Hence, in this context, a politically motivated restraint merely indicates that the scope of the theological-political model—the ceaseless and reciprocal catching up of its two absolutes or excesses—exposes every single, specific, time-bound critique as limited and inadequate, as narrow-minded, regardless of whether genocide is being committed or not. The dirty hands are the hands that have been washed clean. ‘Reason of state’ has the final word, which consists in the name of Israel, precisely because it turns out to be the penultimate word every time. German ‘reason of state’ is legitimised once again by the philosopher in theological-political terms. Is this a ‘philosophy after Auschwitz’ from Germany?

Note:

[i] An English translation (“The Defense of Israel and Its Anti-Judaism. On ‘Reason of State’”) was published online in: K. Jews, Europe, the 21st century, https://k-larevue.com/en/2026/04/23/the-defense-of-israel-and-its-anti-judaism/

The post Philosophy After Auschwitz From Germany: A Note on Christoph Menke’s ‘Critique of Israel’ appeared first on The Philosophical Salon.

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