The conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran has entered a phase where strategic options are dwindling. Far from the initial rhetoric of maximum pressure, the reality facing Washington is much more uncomfortable. Victory is no longer an option. What remains is a choice between two high cost scenarios: accepting an unfavorable outcome or escalating toward a potentially catastrophic conflict.

Trump’s recent retreat — suspending his threat to attack Iranian energy infrastructure — should not be interpreted as an isolated tactical gesture, but rather as an implicit acknowledgment of a practical limit. The threat of force has failed to alter Iranian behavior; on the contrary, it has hardened it. And with that, the superpower is losing credibility.

Thus, the dilemma ceases to be strategic and becomes tragic: either move towards an agreement that involves significant concessions to Tehran, or opt for a military intensification that could widen the regional conflict, drive up global economic costs, and still fail to achieve its objectives.

A Wounded but Emboldened Iran

Washington’s most profound failure has been underestimating the logic of Iran’s strategy in this war. Far from behaving like a classic defensive state — cautious, reactive — Iran is acting more like a high-risk player, choosing to deliberately escalate.

At a strategic level, the Iranian leadership interprets such an escalation as a necessary mechanism to restore deterrence. The message is clear: any attack on its critical assets will be met with a similar or even greater response, including strikes against energy infrastructure and sensitive targets in Israel and the Gulf.

At the operational level, the facts confirm this logic. Despite sustained attacks, the Iranian command and control system continues to function. The coordinated attacks against infrastructure in Haifa or near Dimona, in response to strikes on South Pars and Natanz, demonstrate real-time retaliatory capabilities and strategic coherence.

The fact is that external pressure is not weakening the regime; on the contrary, it is consolidating it. The attacks have strengthened the hardliners, reinforced internal cohesion, and legitimized the escalation in the eyes of the Iranian population. The hypothesis that the war could trigger internal change is, once again, revealed as an illusion.

An Unpopular War With Political Consequences

On the international stage, as The Economist says, “the result is that, at least for now, the advantage lies with Iran.” This is in part because of the domestic situation in the United States, where the war is eroding Trump’s political capital.

Even traditionally supportive media outlets are warning that the Pentagon’s strategy is backfiring. The Wall Street Journal summarizes the shift in sentiment: “Mr. Trump’s unilateral approach has backfired. As the conflict enters its fourth week, initial public hesitancy has transformed into widespread opposition. Polls conducted during the third week show that support for the war has fallen to an average of 39 percent.” A growing majority of people in the U.S. perceive the war as one of choice, not necessity. Moreover, there is an explicit rejection of the associated economic costs — particularly the rising price of gasoline — as well as a widespread apprehension with putting boots on the ground.

Even within the US president’s own electoral base, significant fissures are emerging. A quarter of Americans who voted for him in 2024 disapprove of his policy toward Iran, and this disapproval is especially high among the groups that strongly supported him in the last election: 56% among young adults, and 62% among Hispanics and independents. After Afghanistan and Iraq, American society has developed a clear aversion to protracted wars. And Trump, who built part of his political capital by criticizing those conflicts, now faces the paradox of being trapped in one.

Tensions in the U.S.-Israeli Alliance

While the military conflict appears to have settled into a war of attrition, a growing political rift is emerging between Washington and Tel Aviv. The tension is not tactical, but strategic: there is no agreement on what it means to “win” this war.

For Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, the objective is not merely to weaken Iran. Israel still wishes to provoke a regime collapse that could lead to a scenario of internal fragmentation. The implicit references to other fragmented or destabilized states like Libya, Syria, and Sudan are not accidental: chaos can also be functional if it eliminates a structural adversary.

But Israel’s desires are clashing head-on with U.S. interests. Washington does not want a power vacuum in the Persian Gulf, a region critical to the global energy system and its alliance architecture. The risk of a disintegrated Iran — with militias, armed factions, and the potential for uncontrolled nuclear proliferation — represents a far more dangerous scenario than the current unstable equilibrium.

This divergence of interests extends to the domestic political sphere of both countries. While Netanyahu needs a clear victory in the upcoming elections and enjoys broad domestic support for the war, Donald Trump faces an electorate increasingly hostile to the conflict and concerned about its economic consequences. For Trump, prolonging the war is politically costly; for Netanyahu, ending it without tangible results is unacceptable.

Added to this is a structural factor: Israel’s overestimation of American support. For decades, U.S. military superiority was the invisible pillar of Israeli strategy. Today, however, that guarantee is showing clearer limitations. Washington’s industrial, logistical, and political capacity to sustain a high-intensity conflict is less than many in Israel assumed.

The result is an alliance strained by incompatible objectives: one side wants to end the conflict; the other needs to escalate it to justify it.

Trapped with No Way Out?

On the ground the development of the conflict so far only reinforces the sense of a strategic stalemate. The rise in Iranian missile attacks and, above all, the intensification of rocket launches by Hezbollah from Lebanon, have opened a domestic front for Israel that is increasingly difficult to contain. Investigations carried out by the Israel Defense Forces this week revealed that direct hits on Dimona and Arad caused great distress among the population, increasing doubts about continued support for the war. Meanwhile, in a late-night cabinet meeting, the IDF chief warned that the army is reaching the limits of its capabilities, as forces are being diverted to another escalating front: Jewish terrorism in the West Bank.

Meanwhile, it is becoming increasingly clear that the U.S. leadership has backed itself into a corner and now doesn’t know how to escape without paying a very high price. On the diplomatic front, discussions are no longer about whether there will be concessions, but about which ones will be unavoidable. Iran, emboldened by its resilience, is raising its demands: not only security guarantees and compensation, but also recognition of its rights over the Strait of Hormuz, similar to Egypt’s rights over the Suez Canal. In other words, Iran is demanding a permanent transit toll. At the same time, it is also threatening to close the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, at the entrance to the Red Sea, apparently with the help of the Houthis in Yemen.

Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan are now listed as mediators participating behind the scenes in indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran. Pakistan’s Chief of Staff, Asim Munir, is relaying messages between the two sides. Pakistan’s growing status as a nuclear power in its own right and its strengthening ties with Iran are not viewed favorably in Israel, but Israel’s influence on developments is very limited. The decision on whether and how to reach an agreement rests with Trump.

As we have explained before in La Izquierda Diario, the US administration entered this war, with Israel’s energetic support, without clear strategic objectives and, it seems, with a limited understanding of how decisions are made in Tehran. Trump had thought this would be another Venezuela: a short, decisive blow followed by almost guaranteed success.

Washington is torn between its desire to withdraw from the Persian Gulf and its desire to achieve an impossible victory. Caught between these two options — both currently unfeasible — it is struggling to exert enough pressure to alter the balance of power. But the reality on the ground indicates that there is no viable “military solution” that does not involve a catastrophic escalation, one that would impose severe costs on all parties. For its part, any agreement to end this war will have to be a strategic compromise between the U.S. and Iran, not the maximalist outcome that many in Israel and Washington envisioned. At the opposite extreme, Trump’s increasingly detached, triumphalist rhetoric reflects the confusion reigning in Washington. Through his frequent public appearances, the U.S. president has created an alternate reality, one that does not correspond to the events on the ground. As far as he is concerned, Iran has already been completely defeated, its army destroyed, and its regime replaced “two or three times” after Israel assassinated its top figures (for which Trump retroactively takes credit).

In this context, the possibility of exiting the conflict without it appearing to be a disastrous defeat diminishes daily, and so a desperate maneuver by Trump cannot be ruled out. The specter of Jimmy Carter’s failed military adventure in Iran in 1980 is once again haunting Washington. What began as a show of force risks ending in another major failure.

Originally published in Spanish on March 26 in La Izquierda Diario.

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