This article by Enrique Dussel Peters originally appeared in the February 5, 2026 edition of China Hoy.

Mexico and the People’s Republic of China enjoy a deep, extensive, complex, and mature contemporary socioeconomic relationship. Diplomatic relations with China date back to 1899, and with the People’s Republic of China since 1972. In the second half of the 20th century, the relationship was based on bilateral political and strategic interests within the complex international environment of the Cold War. Since the 21st century, however, the bilateral relationship has shifted toward increasingly pragmatic aspects, centered on its growing economic exchange, particularly trade. The recent debates surrounding the tariff package imposed by Mexico at the end of 2025 are therefore particularly relevant.

Over 20 years of research by the China-Mexico Studies Center (Cechimex) at the Faculty of Economics of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), we have examined in detail specific topics such as foreign trade, financing, foreign direct investment, infrastructure projects, and migration, among others. The issue of tariffs falls within the broader topic of foreign trade between Mexico and China.

Foreign trade between Mexico and China has probably been the most dynamic area in the bilateral relationship in the 21st century, and China has become Mexico’s second largest trading partner since 2003. Several aspects are significant in this regard.

A Strategic Relationship

First, one of the main structural changes in Mexico’s foreign trade in the 21st century concerns the growing participation of Asia, and particularly China. Mexico’s foreign trade with China increased from less than 1% in 2000 to 11.16% in 2024. The United States remains Mexico’s main trading partner, although its share fell sharply, from 81.17% in 1999 to 60.68% in 2024.

Secondly, while China is Mexico’s third-largest export market, it accounted for only 1.47% of total exports in 2024. For Mexico’s foreign trade, the United States remains the primary benchmark, and although Mexico has achieved significant import diversification (in 2024, the US share reached 40.29%, the lowest in the 21st century), in recent decades approximately 80% of Mexican exports have been destined for the United States. In 2024, the United States was the main destination for Mexican exports (83.06%), followed by the European Union (4.28%), Canada (3.06%), and China (1.61%). For Mexican imports in 2024, the United States was the main source (40.12%), followed by China (20.76%) and the European Union (11.24%).

Third, China has become an increasingly leading technology supplier to Mexico. In 1990, for example, only 11.78% of Mexican imports from China were of medium and high technology, rising to 54.39% in 2024. Similarly, the vast majority of Mexican imports from China were intermediate and capital goods (in 2024, capital goods accounted for 30.35% of imports, a share well above that of US imports at 12.90%). China has become a significant supplier of capital and high-technology goods to Mexico.

Fourth, Mexican imports from China have not only significantly increased their presence in Mexico, but have also increasingly displaced imports from the United States. The top five categories of goods imported from China accounted for 75.05% of total imports in 2024 (concentrated primarily in electronics, auto parts, and increasingly in the automotive sector). Historically, the U.S. presence in these categories was significant and by far the most relevant in Mexican imports: in 1995, for example, Mexican imports of electronics and auto parts from the United States represented 79.20% and 35.55%, respectively, of total Mexican imports in these categories; the Chinese share was secondary (which also indicates the presence of other European Union and Asian countries, among others). This structure of Mexican imports, however, has changed radically in recent decades: in 2024, for example, in the electronics sector, a critical input for a large part of Mexican exports, Chinese imports accounted for 33.61% of total Mexican electronics imports, displacing US imports since 2006 (US imports represented only 21.71%). Similar competitive trends are observed in auto parts and particularly in the automotive sector; in the latter, for the first time, Mexican imports from China reached 21.65% in 2024 (still far from the US share, which has been declining since 2000, at 45.88% in 2024).

It is in this context, and given the systemic confrontation between the United States and China that has persisted for at least the last decade, the aggressive measures implemented since Donald Trump’s second presidency in 2015, the pressure exerted by the United States on third countries like Mexico, and the upcoming USMCA negotiations in 2026, that the Mexican government proposed a tariff package on September 9, 2025, for imports from countries with which Mexico does not have trade agreements, including all the BRICS countries and particularly China. The tariff package included 1,463 tariff lines (representing thousands of products) and tariff increases ranging from 5% to 50%. The Chamber of Deputies passed the initiative to the Senate for approval on December 10, 2025.

In summary, we believe it is necessary to reactivate bilateral institutions between Mexico and China. The highest bilateral institution, the Mexico-China Permanent Binational Commission, held its last meeting in 2014, and others, such as the High-Level Investment Group (HLIG), in 2015. This lack of high-level dialogue between the two parties has eroded the possibility of effective coordination in multiple bilateral areas, particularly in foreign trade. Without seeking to justify Mexico’s unilateral measures through the tariff package that came into effect on January 1, 2026, it is also important to understand that its overall impact on trade with China is minor, as estimated above.

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